

2026 Carbon Media Vessel Evaluation Report, Chiquita Canyon Landfill

Chiquita Canyon Landfill
29201 Henry Mayo Dr,
Castaic, CA 91384

SCS ENGINEERS

01204123.45 | July 17, 2026

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This document reports the preliminary findings of an investigation into the potential causes of recent thermal events within the carbon media vessels used for treatment of hydrogen sulfide (H₂S). This report is prepared by SCS Engineers (SCS) in *collaboration* with Chiquita Canyon, LLC (Chiquita), for the Chiquita Canyon Landfill (Landfill) and in compliance with Condition No. 3(b) of the Modified Stipulated Order for Abatement (SOFA) with the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) (Case No. 6177-4), dated June 3, 2026.

SOFA Condition No. 3(b) states the following:

Respondent shall investigate and prepare a report on the potential cause(s) of the recent fires within the carbon media vessels. The report shall detail the results of the investigation and shall be submitted to South Coast AQMD [Baitong Chen, Air Quality Engineer, (bchen@aqmd.gov); Nathaniel Dickel, Senior Air Quality Engineer, (ndickel@aqmd.gov), and Christina Ojeda, Air Quality Inspector, (cojeda@aqmd.gov)] by July 17, 2026.

The investigation into the potential causes of the recent thermal events remains ongoing, as described below. As part of this effort, SCS is conducting additional material testing on the H₂S vessel associated with the events, and additional time is needed to complete that work. As such, this report presents the findings of the investigation to date. SCS, in collaboration with Chiquita, will continue the investigation and will provide a supplemental report presenting the complete material testing results and related analysis once they are available.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The Landfill is located at 29201 Henry Mayo Dr., Castaic, California, 91384 (SCAQMD Facility No. 119219). Chiquita operates an H₂S treatment system that is located approximately 244 feet northeast of the main flare station. The H₂S treatment tanks were installed as part of the landfill gas (LFG) treatment system.

As part of routine tank maintenance activities, fiberglass-reinforced lamination was applied to the false floor of H₂S Tank No. 2. This work was performed to reinforce and restore the structural integrity of the false floor and support the safe, continued operation of the H₂S treatment system. Chiquita also revised its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to address the potential for thermal events during carbon-media changeouts, which was the suspected cause of earlier thermal events.

The H₂S treatment system is connected to the LFG collection system through a 36-inch polyvinyl chloride (PVC) inlet header equipped with 36-inch isolation valves. LFG enters the H₂S treatment tanks via the inlet header, passes through the treatment media for H₂S removal, and exits through a 36-inch outlet pipe equipped with an isolation valve. The treated LFG is then conveyed through a 42-inch header to the main flare station for combustion (Appendix A - Hydrogen Sulfide Tank Map).

On January 16, 2026, while the vessel was in operation, the temperature of the LFG exiting the H₂S treatment system was observed to be significantly higher than typical. In response, SCS personnel used an infrared (IR) camera to evaluate the system and identified a localized hot spot on H₂S Tank No. 2, located behind the access ladder. Site personnel then observed flames emanating from the bottom of H₂S Tank No. 2. To mitigate the situation, site personnel applied water to cool the affected area and placed soil around the base of the tank to contain the contents and prevent any release of material. The flames were subsequently extinguished, and the area was secured.

Following the incident described in this report, H₂S Tank No. 2 was removed from service, and the LFG has since been routed through H₂S Tank Nos. 1 and 4. Operation of the H₂S treatment system was modified as a precautionary measure pending completion of the ongoing forensic investigation and root-cause evaluation. Treatment media has not been reinstalled in any of the tanks, because, until the cause of the incident is understood and appropriate safeguards are identified, operating the vessels with carbon media could present potential safety risks to Chiquita employees and contractors as well as further damage to the LFG system components. As of the date of this report, only H₂S Treatment Tanks Nos. 1 and 4 remain in service, operating without treatment media, while Chiquita continues to investigate the potential causes of the recent events and determine appropriate corrective actions.

3.0 HYDROGEN SULFIDE TREATMENT TANK PERMITTING

Chiquita submitted an application for a centralized H₂S treatment system in April 2018. Following its review of the application, SCAQMD issued the ATC/PTO on December 4, 2018. Since issuance of the ATC/PTO, no modifications have been made to the permitted H₂S treatment system design, configuration, capacity, or operating parameters. Furthermore, the Site has not been directed by SCAQMD to submit permit revisions or modifications specifically related to the operations of the H₂S treatment.

In March 2023, Chiquita submitted a modified permit application to SCAQMD seeking authorization to evaluate and potentially utilize alternative sulfur treatment media, within the existing centralized treatment system. The primary objective of the proposed testing program was to improve removal efficiencies for dimethyl sulfide (DMS) and thereby reducing overall total reduced sulfur (TRS) emissions. The proposed project contemplated replacing the DARCO granular activated carbon in the four (4) operating treatment vessels with alternative media and treatment technologies. In addition, the proposal included utilizing two (2) additional vessels already permitted under the existing PTO, but not yet installed or operated, to facilitate side-by-side media testing and performance evaluations under representative LFG conditions.

Chiquita initially sought authorization for the testing program under SCAQMD Rule 441 (Research Operations). However, on August 9, 2023, SCAQMD formally rejected the application under that permitting mechanism. Following the rejection, Chiquita engaged in multiple discussions with SCAQMD to evaluate alternative potential permitting pathways that could allow implication of the testing program. Despite these efforts, a mutually acceptable permitting approach could not be identified that would allow pilot testing under a reasonable field screening program.

4.0 HYDROGEN SULFIDE TREATMENT TANK SYSTEM DESIGN

The H₂S treatment vessels were designed and manufactured by Daniel Company Air Water Environmental Solutions as part of the Site's Landfill Gas Treatment System (LFGTS). The LFGTS was designed to process and treat up to 16,000 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) of raw LFG. Under the current PTO, the system is permitted for up to six (6) carbon adsorber vessels, each containing a minimum of 27,000 pounds of granular activated carbon media and includes a dedicated LFG bypass line to facilitate operational flexibility and maintenance activities.

Although six (6) vessels are permitted, only four (4) H₂S treatment vessels have been installed and operated at the Site. Each vessel is approximately 12 feet in diameter and an overall height of approximately 17 feet 8 inches. Internally, each vessel contains an activated carbon media bed approximately 9 feet 9 inches in depth, supported by a carbon bed support assembly measuring

approximately 2 feet 11 inches in height (Appendix B - Hydrogen Sulfide Tank Detail). The support assembly consists of a false floor, and associated structural components designed to provide uniform support of the treatment media, while facilitating LFG distribution through the vessel.

Prior to the January 16, 2026, incident, the vessels were filled with DARCO BG1 activated carbon media and operated for the removal of H₂S and other sulfur-containing compounds from the LFG stream before downstream treatment and combustion. The adsorption system was intended to reduce sulfur concentrations in the LFG, thereby minimizing concentrations, reducing sulfur-related emissions, and protecting downstream treatment and control equipment, including the main flare station and associated LFG handling infrastructure.

5.0 HYDROGEN SULFIDE TREATMENT TANK NO. 2 INVESTIGATION AND FINDINGS

Following the H₂S treatment tank No.2 thermal event, Chiquita worked with the system manufacturer to evaluate potential causes; however, neither Chiquita nor the manufacturer was able to determine a definitive cause. The evaluation was limited due to damage to internal tank components during the event, which affected the ability to identify the specific failure mechanism.

Following the June 2026 SCAQMD hearing and the June 3, 2026, modification of the SOFA, SCS, on behalf of CCL, expanded investigative efforts already underway to conduct a more comprehensive root cause investigation consistent with SOFA Condition 3(b).

As part of this effort, SCS contacted the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Fire Prevention Bureau – Petroleum Chemical Unit (LACFD), as well as multiple independent forensic investigators, to perform an evaluation of the affected H₂S treatment system and identify potential causes associated with the H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 combustion event. Several private forensic investigators were contacted; however, multiple firms were unable to accept the assignment due to varying constraints, including availability and the required project schedule and turnaround timeframe.

Two independent on-site inspections were conducted on July 7, 2026, to evaluate the condition of the H₂S treatment system, document the post-incident conditions, and support evaluation of the potential root cause of the event.

The first inspection was conducted by the LACFD. The second inspection was conducted by 4X Forensic Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (4X Forensics) to conduct a forensic evaluation of the affected tank and tank components, and identify potential evidence related to the failure mechanism (Appendix C - Photo Log – Carbon Media Vessel No. 2).

5.1 FIRE DEPARTMENT INSPECTION SUMMARY

The LACFD inspected the H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 event however, they were unable to determine the origin or cause of the incident. After consulting with the Arson/Fire Investigation Unit, the inspector concluded that the passage of time and the intervening removal, cleaning, and analysis of certain damaged tank components limited the ability to reconstruct the original incident conditions and conduct a conclusive origin-and-cause investigation.

The LACFD recommended that the forensic evaluation focus on examination of the preserved tank components and other available physical evidence to identify potential indicators of thermal

damage, electrical failure, mechanical wear, or other conditions that may have contributed to the incident.

To support the investigation, the LACFD recommended providing the investigator with available information and materials, including tank components, photographs and records from the initial incident response, maintenance and inspection records, permitting documentation, and relevant operational, monitoring, or Remote Monitoring and Control (RMC) data collected before and during the event.

5.2 4XFORENSIC ENGINEERING INSPECTION FINDINGS

4XForensic initiated a preliminary engineering analysis reference H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 on July 2, 2026. Subsequently, on July 7, 2026, 4XForensic conducted an on-site forensic inspection of H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2. During the inspection, 4XForensic evaluated the condition of the affected vessel and identified the specific tank sections requiring laboratory analysis. 4XForensic also provided recommendations regarding sample locations, extraction procedures, and preservation methods to support subsequent laboratory evaluation. Consistent with the Fire Department's recommendation, relevant information and materials was provided to 4XForensic for consideration as part of its evaluation.

SCS personnel supported the inspection activities by excavating soil adjacent to the southern side of the tank to facilitate access to the affected areas, removing the designated tank sections identified by 4XForensic, and transporting the collected samples to the SCS Long Beach office for transfer to 4XForensic. As part of its forensic evaluation, 4XForensic is conducting visual and microscopic examinations, digital documentation, Hirox digital imaging, scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and energy dispersive spectroscopy (EDS) analyses. At the time of this report, the selected tank samples have been delivered to 4XForensic, and laboratory testing and forensic evaluation activities are in progress.

According to 4XForensic's preliminary observations and findings, the damage observed in the H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 appears to be associated with the combined effects of a prior repair condition and elevated operating temperatures. 4XForensic's review of the tank drawings indicated the vessel was designed with glass-fiber reinforcement; however, no glass fiber was identified in the submitted samples from the repaired area. The apparent absence of glass fiber reinforcement is considered a potential contributing factor in reducing the temperature resistance and structural integrity of the affected area.

The evaluation also identified evidence of elevated temperature, including oxidation and deformation of internal elastomer support components. Residue analysis confirmed the presence of carbon and bromine, findings consistent with the use of bromine-impregnated activated carbon media within the treatment system.

The investigation remains ongoing; however, preliminary findings indicate that the combination of the apparent absence of reinforcement in the repaired area and elevated operating temperatures may have been the primary contributing factors associated with the event. Based on the evaluation completed to date, 4XForensic does not consider the remaining H₂S treatment vessels to be at immediate risk of failure, although internal support components may have experienced similar thermal effects.

The results of the laboratory analysis and final forensic evaluation will be incorporated into this report upon completion and receipt of the final findings. Any additional observations, conclusions, or recommendations resulting from the completed forensic evaluation will be evaluated and incorporated as appropriate to provide a comprehensive assessment of the H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 event.

6.0 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Chiquita continues to investigate the cause of the H₂S Treatment Tank No. 2 thermal event that occurred on January 16, 2026. Available operational data indicate that, at approximately 10:40 p.m., the outlet LFG temperature increased from approximately 78° Fahrenheit (°F) to 246°F, indicating that abnormal thermal conditions developed within the treatment system.

Based on the information currently available, several factors may have contributed to the event, including changes in LFG composition, elevated volatile organic compound (VOC) and/or increased oxygen (O₂) concentrations, localized heating within the carbon media, and/or vessel-specific conditions. These factors may have promoted conditions conducive to an exothermic reaction within the treatment media, resulting in the development of localized hot spots within the vessel. Preliminary forensic observations also noted that the failure occurred in the vicinity of an area that had undergone repairs between July 8 and July 11, 2024. Initial findings indicate that the repaired area may differ from the original vessel construction; however, the significance of these observations and their potential relationship to the event remain under evaluation.

At this time, the available evidence does not support identification of a single definitive cause or failure mechanism. Rather, the incident may have resulted from a combination of factors that collectively contributed to the event. The exact sequence of events and the relative contribution of each potential factor cannot be determined with certainty based on the information currently available.

The forensic evaluation and laboratory analyses remain ongoing. Upon completion of the investigation, the results will be incorporated into this report, and conclusions and recommendations will be updated as appropriate.

In addition, based on the recent inspections and preliminary findings, Chiquita proposes to conduct further evaluations of the remaining H₂S treatment tank that is currently out of service to assess vessel condition and identify any additional information that may assist in understanding the circumstances surrounding the incident and support the ongoing investigation.

Appendix A

Hydrogen Sulfide Tank Map



SCS ENGINEERS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS 3900 KILROY AVENUE SUITE 100 LONG BEACH, CA 90806 (562) 426-9544	CLIENT:		 CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL CASTAIC, CALIFORNIA	SHEET TITLE: GENERAL LAYOUT	NO.	REVISION	DATE
	PROJECT TITLE: 2018 H2S TREATMENT SYSTEM CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL						
	PROJ. NO. 07214050.22						
	DSK. BY: SS						
	DSK. BY: SS						
DATE: 11-20-2019		SCALE: AS SHOWN		1			

Appendix B


Hydrogen Sulfide Tank Detail



PLAN
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"



ELEVATION
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"



SECTION
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"

SCHEDULE							
NO.	SERVICE	QTY.	SIZE	PROJ.	ELEV.	FITTING	DETAIL
A	INLET	1	24"Ø	6"	TOP	ANSI	1
B	OUTLET	1	24"Ø	6"	1'-6"	ANSI	1
C-1	MANWAY	1	30"Ø	6"	7'-6"	ANSI	1
C-2		1	30"Ø	6"	TOP	ANSI	1
D	RUPTURE DISK PORT	1	10"Ø	6"	TOP	ANSI	1
E	DRAIN	1	2"Ø	6"	3"	ANSI	1
F-1	CARBON SAMPLE PORT	1	1 1/2"Ø	3"	3'-7"	FNPT	2
F-2		1	1 1/2"Ø	3"	7'-10"	FNPT	2
F-3		1	1 1/2"Ø	3"	12'-1"	FNPT	2
G-1	DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE PORT	1	1"Ø	3"	2'-2"	FNPT	2
G-2		1	1"Ø	3"	13'-6"	FNPT	2
H	PRESSURE GAUGE BRACKET	1	-	-	4'-3"	-	3
I	GROUNDING ROD	1	-	-	13'-6"	-	4
J	ANCHOR LUG	10	-	-	BOTTOM	-	5
K	GUIDE LUG	3	-	-	14'-4"	-	6
L	LADDER	1	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: ELEVATION INDICATES CENTER LINE ELEVATION EXCEPT FOR ANCHOR LUGS

LAMINATE SEQUENCES		
ITEM	MIN. THK.	SEQUENCE
SHELL	0.72"	V, 2C, FW, U, 11FW
SHELL STIFFENERS	0.47"	3(CR)C, 2(CR)C
DISH TOP	0.96"	V, 2C, 3[3(CR)C], C
FLAT BOTTOM	1.38"	V, 2C, 4[3(CR)C], 2(CR)C
KNUCKLE	2.10"	V, 2C, 7[3(CR)C], CRC
SHELL TO KNUCKLE	0.81"	3[3(MR)M]
SHELL TO DISH TOP	0.81"	3[3(MR)M]

MATERIAL SPECIFICATION KEY:
CB = CORROSION BARRIER
C = CHOPPER GUN APPLIED, 0.043" THICK (W-CR/ADVANTEX)
E = EXOTHERM 1 1/2 OZ. MAT
M = 1 LAYER OF 1 1/2 OZ. MAT OR CHOPPER GUN APPLIED, 0.043" THICK (W-CR/ADVANTEX)
N = NEXUS VEIL, 10 MILS
R = 1 LAYER OF 24 OZ./YD^2 WOVEN ROVING 0.033" THICK
U = 1 LAYER OF 16 OZ./YD^2 UNIDIRECTIONAL
V = C-VEIL, 10 MILS.
FW = 75° FILAMENT WOUND HELICAL CYCLE 250 YIELD GLASS 0.05" THICK MIN.

NOTES:
1. VESSELS DESIGNED FOR VACUUM PRESSURE OF 100" W.C.

QTY (2)

REVISIONS		
REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION
03	4/09/2018	REVISED DETAILS

SIZE: B	DWG: 12'-0"Ø CARB. 1 & 3	DRAWN BY: CB
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"	DIR: 3595 CHIQUITA	DATE: 1/16/2018



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

1939 W. 11th St. Ste. E
Upland, CA 91786
Phone: (909) 982-1555
Fax: (909) 982-1855

VERIFY SCALE
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ORIGINAL IS
1" LONG


CASTAIC, CA
CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL
H2S TREATMENT SYSTEM
12'Ø CARBON ADSORBER 1 & 3 (QTY: 2)



PLAN
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"



ELEVATION
SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"



SECTION
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SCHEDULE							
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H	PRESSURE GAUGE BRACKET	1	-	-	4'-3"	-	3
I	GROUNDING ROD	1	-	-	13'-6"	-	4
J	ANCHOR LUG	10	-	-	BOTTOM	-	5
K	GUIDE LUG	3	-	-	14'-4"	-	6
L	LADDER	1	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: ELEVATION INDICATES CENTER LINE ELEVATION EXCEPT FOR ANCHOR LUGS

LAMINATE SEQUENCES		
ITEM	MIN. THK.	SEQUENCE
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QTY (2)

REVISIONS		
REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION
03	4/09/2018	REVISED DETAILS

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SCALE: 1/4" = 1' 0"	DIR: 3595 CHIQUITA	DATE: 1/16/2018




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Phone: (909) 982-1555
Fax: (909) 982-1855

VERIFY SCALE
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ORIGINAL IS
1" LONG


CASTAIC, CA
CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL
H2S TREATMENT SYSTEM
12'Ø CARBON ADSORBER 2 & 4 (QTY: 2)




- NOTES:
 1. BOLT HOLES STRADDLE MAJOR CENTERLINES (2-HOLE)
 2. GUSSETS REQUIRED FOR NOZZLES 4"Ø AND SMALLER

FLG SPEC	SIZE (INCHES)	OD OF FLANGE	BOLT CIRCLE DIAMETER	NUMBER OF BOLTS	BOLT HOLE DIAMETER	T (MIN)
ANSI	2"Ø	6 1/2"	4 3/4"	4	3/4"	3/4"
ANSI	10"Ø	16 1/2"	14 1/4"	12	1"	15/16"
ANSI	24"Ø	32"	29 1/2"	20	1 3/8"	1 5/8"
ANSI	30"Ø	38 1/4"	36"	28	1 3/8"	2"


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
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
DETAIL 3 - PRESSURE GAUGE MOUNT



DETAIL 4 - SST GROUNDING ROD



DETAIL 5 - TYPE II ANCHOR LUG



MATERIAL : 316 STAINLESS STEEL

H	W	L	T	E	Ø
8"	6"	4"	1/2"	2 3/8"	3/4"

[Signature]

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


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
1939 W. 11th St. Ste. E
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VERIFY SCALE
 0 1"
 ORIGINAL IS
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
CASTAIC, CA
 CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL
 H2S TREATMENT SYSTEM
 12'Ø CARBON ADSORBER - DETAILS




DETAIL 7 - TRAPEZOIDAL STIFFENER



DETAIL 8 - MEDIA SUPPORT ORIENTATION



DETAIL 9 - GRATING SUPPORT RING



DETAIL 10 - MEDIA BEAM AND HALF PIPE SUPPORT

Shawhin

SIZE: B	DWG: DETAILS	DRAWN BY: CB
SCALE: N/A	DIR: 3595 CHIQUITA	DATE: 1/16/2018



DANIEL COMPANY
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VERIFY SCALE
0 1"
ORIGINAL IS
1" LONG

CASTAIC, CA
CHIQUITA CANYON LANDFILL
H2S TREATMENT SYSTEM
12'Ø CARBON ADSORBER - DETAILS

LAYOUT REVISED: 12/06/2017

Appendix C

Photo Log – Carbon Media Vessel No. 2

Photograph No.: 001

Carbon Media Vessel
No.2.



Photograph No.: 002

Carbon Media Vessel –
Thermal Event Location



Photograph No.: 003

Carbon Media Vessel –
thermal event location.



Photograph No.: 004

Carbon Media Vessel –
thermal event location



Photograph No.: 005

Carbon Media Vessel –
False floor



Photograph No.: 006

Carbon Media Vessel –
thermal event location



Photograph No.: 007

Carbon Media Vessel –
180 degrees from the
thermal event location



Photograph No.: 008

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 009

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 0010

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 011

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 012

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 013

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 014

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair



Photograph No.: 015

Carbon Media Vessel –
July 2024 Repair

